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EXSISTENTIAL MOTIVATION AND THE EXPRESSION AND REGULATION OF

RELIGIOUS FAITH AMONG BELIEVERS AND ATHEISTS
MADHWA. S. GALGALI

ABSTRACT
The present study draws upon terror management theory (TMT) and cognitive

science of religion (CSR) to investigate how religious believers and atheists motivational
and cognitive processes might interact to affect the expression of religious intuitions and
beliefs. TMT suggests the motivation to manage mortality-related concerns can lead to

religious concepts, and CSR suggests religious concepts are highly intuitive but that

individuals can sometimes engage in deliberate/analytical thinking to override them. The

present research therefore proposes two theoretical ideas: 1) among religious believers,
mortality awareness should increase the intuitive appeal of religious concepts, as well as
the acceptance of those intuitions as expressed religious belief; and 2) among atheists,

mortality awareness should similarly increase the intuitive appeal of religious concepts,
but not expressed religious faith because (despite recognizing them as intuitively
appealing) atheists may wield their available self-regulatory resources (e.g., analytic

thinking) to over-ride those intuitions and thus abstain from expressing religious belief.

Christians and atheists were recruited and randomly assigned to either a mortality
salience condition or pain salience condition; then, each participant was asked to rate the

extent to which they found religious concepts intuitively appealing and the extent to

which they accept and express those concepts as religious belief. A 2 (between-subjects:
Christian vs. atheist) x 2 (between-subjects: MS vs. pain) x 4 (within-subjects: want
supernatural agents, believe in supernatural agents, want afterlife, believe in an afterlife)
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mixed-model ANOVA found the data patterns were consistent with hypotheses;

implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In his book, A Confession, Leo Tolstoy (Tolstoy, 1884) attempts to understand

faith through a fable about a traveler being chased by an angry beast. To evade the beast,

the man climbs down into a dry well, only to find that at the bottom of the well is a
dragon waiting with open jaws. To stop from sliding down toward the dragon, he clings

to a twig growing on the side of the well. The twig, he soon discovers, is being eaten at
the root by two mice (one black, one white, representing the passing of night and day)

and will soon snap. With the beast above, the dragon below, and the twig about to snap,
the traveler realizes that he will inevitably perish. While clinging to the twig, however, he

notices drops of honey upon its leaves and contents himself to enjoy their sweet taste
while he awaits his inevitable death. Tolstoy’s allegory suggests the average person who

recognizes the dragon (death) awaiting him will grasp for the twig (life) but that, upon
recognizing its sour impermanence, will endure the situation by turning toward and

accepting whatever might give our brief existence a sweeter character—such as the
religious promises of eternal souls, spirits, and life after death.
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In contrast, consider non-believer and Holocaust survivor Primo Levi’s

experience, recounted in The Drowned and the Saved (1986):

This happened in October 1944, in the one moment in which I lucidly perceived
the imminence of deaths naked and compressed among my naked companions
with my personal index card in hand, I was waiting to file past the ‘commission’
that with one glance would decide whether I should go immediately into the gas
chamber or was instead strong enough to go on working. For one instance I felt
the need to ask for help and asylum; then, despite my anguish, equanimity
prevailed: one does not change the rules of the game at the end of the match, not
when you are losing. A prayer under these conditions would have been not only
absurd (what rights could I claim? And from whom?) but blasphemous, obscene,
laden with the greatest impiety of which a nonbeliever is capable. I rejected the
temptation: I knew that otherwise were I to survive, I would have to be ashamed
of it. (p. 145-146)

To borrow Tolstoy’s language, Levi found himself clinging to the twig, face-to-face with

the dragon, and although aware of the temptation to reach up to enjoy the twig’s honey—

chose not to; that is, chose to face death without indulging in expressions of religious

faith.

The two examples above suggest both similarities and differences in the way that

religious and non-religious people might process religious cognitions when managing
existential concerns. Tolstoy’s fable suggests death awareness causes religious people to
recognize the intuitive appeal of religious concepts, and to then consciously accept them.
But Levi’s story suggests that although the awareness of mortality might cause non
believers to similarly recognize the tempting appeal of religious concepts, upon further

reflection they might ultimately refrain from expressing religious faith. The present study
builds upon both terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., 2014) and the

cognitive science of religion (e.g., Barrett, 2007) to formalize and test those ideas.
Samples of Christians and atheists were recruited, and each were randomly assigned to be
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reminded of either death or a control topic. Then, participants rated the intuitive appeal of
religious concepts (i.e., how much they want gods and afterlife to be real) as well as their
explicit acceptance of those religious concepts as expressed religious belief/faith.

1.1 Death Awareness at the Heart of Human Experience
Rooted in the writings of Ernest Becker, Terror Management Theory (TMT) notes

that humans, like other animals, are evolutionarily oriented toward survival and

reproduction. If a lion gives chase, both the gazelle and the human can recognize the
existential threat and will take flight as a result, but humans have the capacity for some
rather complex, sophisticated, and symbolic thought, and—as a result—they can

appreciate the more abstract concept of mortality: that most if not all living things,
including themselves, will eventually die. Because there is no physical threat (e.g., a
hungry lion), there is no physical coping strategy (e.g., fight/flight); instead, TMT

suggests humans developed psychological means of coping with the concept of mortality.
Specifically, TMT proposes that people cope with the awareness of their

impermanence through the development of and participation in sociocultural systems that

offer some sense of permanence. Such systems might offer opportunity to contribute to
some sort of legacy, allowing people to feel that they are part of something larger and

longer lasting than themselves (e.g., families, states, nations, religious/ethnic groups, and
even sports teams). More directly, such systems might offer ideas suggesting death is not
the end, and that one will still continue to exist even after one’s physical death; examples

of such beliefs include beliefs about souls, gods, heaven, etc. Historically such beliefs
have manifested in various forms in religious ideas. In that context, positive or negative

self-esteem is thus a reflection of whether one perceives themselves to be meeting the
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standards and values of one’s particular cultural worldviews, thus earning the
permanence on offer.
One of the most common ways to test TMT has been the mortality salience (MS)

hypothesis, which holds: if one’s cultural worldviews act as a way to manage death
awareness, then increasing the awareness of death (i.e., making mortality salient) should
lead to increased expression of faith in one’s sociocultural worldview and increased

defense of such worldviews. For example, one of the earliest TMT studies testing this

hypothesis recruited a sample of municipal court judges (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). The
judges were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: they were either prompted to

think about their own mortality (MS) or about a non-mortality-related comparison topic

(e.g., pain). Then, they were presented with a case about a defendant accused of violating
the criminal and moral standards of the judges worldviews—a case involving a

prostitution charge. Compared to the control condition, in the MS condition the judges set

a much harsher bail amount, suggesting that the increase awareness of death increased the
judges vindictive defense of their cultural standards and values. In a more recent study

(Vail, Arndt, Motyl, et al., 2012), stimuli that increased the awareness of death also
increased both hostile worldview defense (e.g., American’s support for military defense

of American interests) as well as stronger faith in one’s particular worldview beliefs (i.e.,
ideological dogmatism). Hundreds of studies, conducted in dozens of countries and in
many cultures, have similarly found support for TMT via the MS hypothesis (Routledge
& Vess, 2018).
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1.2 TMT and Religious Beliefs

Some of the earliest evidence of modern human cultural activity features religious

belief as its centerpiece. The Upper Paleolithic (40-60,000 years ago) brought with it the
“cultural big bang”: the emergence of a flurry of creativity and indications of

coordinated, symbolic social activity among our ancestral forebears (Mithen, 1996).

Among the relics, archeological records of that period show the emergence of ritual

burials suggestive of afterlife beliefs, as well as the emergence of a number of “sacred”
artworks such as statues believed to depict gods/goddesses and murals believed to reflect
ritualistic efforts to safeguard the souls of the deceased amid a spiritual realm (e.g.,

Tattersall, 1998). Such ritualistic, symbolic activity reveals, among other things, the

development of a dualistic mental separation of mind and body—the apparent

apprehension that our mortal body is but a temporary vessel containing an intangible
essence that persists after death (e.g., Hauser, 1951). Since then, religious beliefs have

similarly continued to color the human experience; today, polls show some form of
supernatural belief professed by 93% of Americans and 84% globally (Pew, 2012,
2015a).

To understand why religion has been so prevalent throughout human history,

some have posited, for example, that religious beliefs are: byproducts of other adaptive

functions (thus, epiphenomena with no primary function themselves; Boyer,

2001;Kirkpatrick, 2004); or that they primarily serve a coalitional function (Durkheim,
1912/1995; Sloan-Wilson, 2002); or that they are perhaps parasitic memes, cultural
analogs to genes—self-replicating, mutating, and responding to selective pressures at the

expense of their hosts (Dwakins, 2006). TMT, however, argues that an important function
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of religious belief is to address the potential existential anxiety arising from the human
awareness of mortality (Landau et al., 2004; Vail et al., 2012). As Bertrand Russell

commented: “If we were not afraid of death, I do not believe that the idea of immortality
would ever have arisen.. .immortality removes the terror from death.” (1957, p. 53-54).

Even the earliest piece of literature we have, the Epic of Gilgamesh (~3000 B.C.E.)
portrays the ancient Sumerian king on a quest to learn the secret of immortality after
having been struck by the death of his close friend, Enkidu. In that light, religious cultural

worldviews are unique in that they offer a supernatural immortality. It is difficult to
imagine a more direct, more expedient solution to the problem of death than to believe

that death is not the end—that he or she has a supernatural essence, a soul that will

literally permanently exist beyond physical death.
Empirical support for the terror management function of religion has been
steadily growing. In correlational studies, for example, religious belief and commitment

among Christians (Harding et al., 2005), Muslims (Suhail & Akram, 2002; Roshdieh et

al., 1999), and Jews (Florian & Rravetz, 1983) have repeatedly been associated with

lower death anxiety (see Jong et al., 2018 for meta-analytic review of similar findings).
More compellingly, experimental evidence shows that people who believe in an afterlife

increase their faith in it after being reminded of death (Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973;

Schoenrade, 1989). Similarly, after being reminded of mortality, providing participants
with (faked) scientific evidence of spiritual afterlife eliminated the subsequent MS-

induced increases in worldview defense and self-esteem striving that were otherwise
observed (Dechesne et al., 2003). Thus, reminders of an afterlife appears to buffer against
the awareness of death. And belief in an immortal soul has been associated with less
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resistance to (faked) scientific evidence predicting the end of the world and humanity,
suggesting that belief in an immortal soul helps protect against the threat of more material

end of world scenarios (Lifshin et al., 2016).
In addition to eternal spiritual existence, religions also step in to explain the

creation of the world: identifying the supernatural creator(s), revealing how those creators
have established and maintain order in the world, and prescribing the thoughts and

behaviors that lead down the path to immortality. Creation stories and other religious
myths affirm the eternal spiritual realm by divining “spiritual histories” of one’s way of
life: from creation of the universe ex nihilo via a god’s telekinetic fiat, or from sex

between the earth and sky, or a creator bird plunging the depths of a primordial ocean to

retrieve the seeds of life and the mud of our terrestrial world (Leeming & Leeming,
1994). Such myths about creation, and gods and spirits, serve a terror management

function by casting the self as a player in a supernatural drama stretching indefinitely
backward and forward in time. Accordingly, research has shown that challenging

creationists’ beliefs, by presenting them with evolutionary evidence contradicting
creationism, increases the accessibility of death-related cognitions (Schimel et al., 2007).

Similarly, MS can reduce acceptance of evolutionary theory and increase acceptance of
the “theory of intelligent design” (Tracy et al., 2011), and increase faith in gods and
supernatural agents (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012).

But maintaining faith in gods, spirits, and other ornaments of one’s religion
involves believing in and valuing things that are inherently unverifiable. The

apprehended validity of one’s religion, or any other cultural worldview, is instead heavily
influenced by social consensus (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Fellow believers help verify
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one’s religious belief as righteous and true, whereas encountering apostates, atheists,

and/or followers of alternative religions can be problematic because it raises the

possibility that one’s own religion is not a valid or worthwhile path to immortality. As
Becker noted, “One of the main reasons that cultures can be so directly undermining to

one another is that, despite their many varieties, they all ask and answer the same basic

questions. So that when two different ways of life come into contact they clash on the
same vital points” (1962, p. 113). As a result, TMT research has demonstrated that when

reminded of mortality, people not only affirm faith in their specific religious beliefs and
deny faith in the alternatives (Vail, Arndt, et al., 2012) but they also express support for
fellow believers (Greenberg et al., 1990 ; Kosloff et al., 2010) and express derogatory
attitudes or even support violence against followers of alternative religions (Hayes et al.,

2008; Pyszczynski et al., 2006).
1.3 Existential Motivation and Cognitive Processes in Belief/Unbelief
Although the vast majority of people around the world are religious, the number

of people claiming to be non-religious is notable and growing (Pew, 2012, 2015a). But
with a few notable exceptions, little work has directly investigated how the religious and
non-religious might differ in the way they might (or might not) rely upon religious
concepts to manage the awareness of mortality.

Religion and atheism. First, as has been noted above, religious worldviews offer
to their adherents opportunities for both supernatural and secular immortality. On the one

hand, religions offer opportunity for non-supernatural (“secular”) routes to immortality in

much the same way that any other social group—a nation or university, an orchestra or

sports team—would: by offering an opportunity to become a valued member of a
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seemingly permanent cultural group, with a larger and longer lasting impact than oneself.
But the defining, unique quality of religious worldviews is that they also offer a

supposedly supernatural immortality (i.e., continued existence in an eternal spiritual
realm) that can be attained by engaging in the specific thoughts and behaviors outlined by

its moral and theological code; perhaps gaining eternal life through prayer, taking
communion, observing fire pooja, treating others kindly, or even just simply believing.

Atheism, however, traces a tradition of skepticism that stretches through
Renaissance thought to ancient Indic and Greek doubts, often echoing Epicurian lines of
thought (e.g., Lucretius, C. 50 B.C./2007), drawing upon advances in naturalism (e.g.,

Darwin, 1859) and other rational and scientific progress, and/or recoiling from the logical

contradictions and social and moral failures of religions and their supposed supernatural
agents (e.g., Hitchens, 2007; Hume, 1779/2009; Kant, 1781/2009). Although there may
be different types of atheists (e.g.,Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Coleman et al., 2015),

ultimately, as Dawkins put it, an atheist “...is somebody who believes there is nothing
beyond the natural, physical world; no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind

the observable universe; no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles - except in the
sense of natural phenomena that we don’t yet understand” (p. 35, 2008, italics original).

That is, atheism is at least the lack of belief in religious ideas about the supernatural and

at most the explicit rejection of the supernatural. Thus, atheists may represent an

appropriate comparison population for studying the motivational and cognitive processes
involved in engaging or not engaging in religious terror management strategies. In that
light, we next consider the cognitively intuitive power of religious concepts and some

critical factors in the emergence of religious belief vs. atheism.
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Cognitive processes of belief. Some have argued that religious belief enjoys a
natural cognitive advantage, in the sense that “much of what is typically called ‘religion’

may be understood as the natural product of aggregated ordinary cognitive processes”
(Barrett, 2000, p. 29). That is, the religious conceptualizations of supernatural agents,

immortal souls, and afterlife are buttressed by basic, evolutionarily adaptive cognitive
inclinations to make intuitive causal attributions and interpret others’ intentions (theory

of mind), make moral judgments, engage in social learning, and judge the utility or
purposes of people and objects (teleological reasoning), among other tasks (e.g., Barrett,

2004; Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 1994). As but one example, the evolutionarily
adaptive ability to detect the intentions of others ostensibly created an inclination to see
agency where there is none, to see “faces in the clouds” (Guthrie, 1995; Barrett, 2000);

for instance, in much the same way as observing an arrow strike one’s shoulder would
lead one to wonder who shot the arrow, observing lightning strike one’s village might
lead one to wonder who shot the lightning bolt. The research on such so-called religious

cognition has led some to conclude that religious “^belief is a ‘cognitive default’ and
that, all else being equal, in any given cultural context religious beliefs are driven into
expression by a universal, evolved, core set of psychological intuitions present in all
normal human brains” (Bering, 2012, p. 166).
However, although it may be true that religious cognition (esp. intuition) is
default, it is not necessarily the case that it drives religious belief into expression in any

given cultural context. Rather, religious intuitions appear to be only necessary, but not
sufficient, components driving religious belief. As Norenzayan and Gervais (2013)
argued, for a person to express religious faith, s/he must:
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a) be able to execute the cognitive processes (biases) that give rise to religious
intuitions;
b) be motivated to accept supernatural beliefs as real and relevant worldviews;

c) receive cultural inputs that a specific set of supernatural concepts (e.g., the

trimurti, karma, reincarnation, nirvana) should be believed in as real and
relevant; and

d) accept those intuitions without further analytic processing.

Such components may be ordinary, even highly probable (e.g., Barrett; Bering, 2010), but
they are not inevitable. As will be illustrated below, modifications that negate any of
these four can and do occur, potentially resulting in atheism (Norenzayan & Gervais,

2013).

First, it may not always be the case that individuals are able to fully engage in the
otherwise ordinary cognitive processes that give rise to religious intuitions (Gervais,

2014), such as may be the case with young children (Lane et al., 2010) or individuals

with clinical diagnoses of autism (Norenzayan et al., 2012). Of course, the majority of
people can easily represent minds and gods, and engage in other similar cognitive tasks,
but, as we will see below, the fact that fully-functioning adults can engage in such

cognitively intuitive processes does not inevitably produce religious belief.
Second, individuals might not always be motivated to convert religious intuitions

into religious belief. Indeed, religious activity appears to be less prevalent in regions

marked by strong secular governments and social services, relative economic prosperity
and equality, and health and safety (P. Zuckerman, 2008), whereas it is more prevalent in
areas marked by weak or absent secular governments, violence and economic instability,
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and shorter life expectancies (Gray & Wegner, 2010;Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Yet,

numerous theoretical and research traditions hold that other various self-relevant
threats—whether the witness of suffering (Gray & Wegner, 2010), feelings of uncertainty
(Kay et al., 2010; Rutjens et al., 2010) , isolation (Epley et al., 2008), or death awareness

(Vail et al., 2010)—can intensify belief in religious worldviews for one reason or another.

It is difficult, however, to imagine societies that can eliminate, or even reduce, the
prevalence or onset of such motivational conditions as the awareness of mortality.

The third component, cultural learning processes—e.g., modeling, imitation,

instruction—enable people to translate their religious intuitions, when so motivated, into

specific, socially validated sets of supernatural beliefs (Berger & Luckmann, 1967;
Harris, 2012; Rendell et al., 2011). Not only do people tend to learn culturally endorsed

beliefs and behaviors (Tomasello et al., 1993), but preferentially learn beliefs perceived
to be socially normative (Joe Henrich & Boyd, 1998), prestigious (Henrich & Gil-White,

2001), and important enough to be ostensibly worth various demonstrable costs (Henrich,

2009). In contrast, people in regions with relatively fewer sincere public expressions of
religious belief (e.g., Scandinavia) might not be guided to translate their cognitive

inclinations into any particular expression of religious faith (Gervais et al., 2011;
Zuckerman, 2008). Such people might instead learn to live according to secular beliefs

and institutions, building cognitive conceptual networks that can potentially direct

existential motivation toward the intuitive expression of more secular, non-religious ways
of life. However, the present thesis takes place within the American context, which is

saturated with religious concepts and modeling of religious behavior and belief.
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Therefore, the present thesis accepts that most people who have participated in the

present thesis study: a) will be able to engage in the otherwise ordinary cognitive
processes that give rise to religious intuitions; b) live in a world in which they regularly
encounter stimuli the might motivate them to convert those intuitions into belief—such as
the awareness of death; and c) live within a social context (America) in which religious

faith is socially normative. The fourth component is more interesting, however, because it
suggests ways that analytic thinking might influence individuals’ religious (vs. notreligious) terror management processes.

Specifically, the fourth and most common form (Silver et al., 2014) of atheism

appears to occur when individuals consciously revise, or over-ride, their cognitive

intuitions—when they do not allow intuition to result in religious belief. The research on
this topic is consistent with dual-process models of cognitive processing (Chaiken &
Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008, 2010; also Baumard & Boyer, 2013) which hold that intuitive

processing (System 1) is quick, automatic, and implicit, whereas reflective processing

(System 2) is typically slower, more deliberate, and explicit. For example, in contrast to
reliance on intuitive cognitive processes, which is indeed associated with stronger
religious belief, weaker and less prevalent religious belief occurs among those who
engage in more analytic thinking, such as scientists (Larson & Witham, 1998; Mccauley,

2013; Pew, 2009), those with greater intelligence (M. Zuckerman et al., 2013for recent
meta-analysis), and those with a more chronically analytic cognitive style (Pennycook et
al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2012). While analytic cognitive style helps over-ride cognitive

intuitions that lead, for example, to endorsement of creationism rather than evolution
(Will M. Gervais, 2015), experimental conditions that prevent analytic thinking (e.g.,
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high-speed response trials) have been found to prevent people from over-riding those

intuitions—leading Finnish and American atheists to make cognitively intuitive errors
consistent with religious creationist views (Järnefelt et al., 2015). Further experimental
evidence shows that activating analytic thinking (e.g., via perceptual disfluency, or

image-based or lexical primes of analytic thinking concepts), presumably over-riding
intuition, decreases religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012).

Similarities and differences in religious and atheist terror management
processes. By interfacing TMT (Routledge & Vess, 2019) with dual process models of
religious cognition (e.g., Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), the present thesis predicts a
systematic set of similarities and differences between religious believers and atheists

managing the awareness of mortality. First, I anticipate that when made aware of the

concept of mortality, both religious believers and atheists alike should similarly prepare
intuitive cognitive solutions, which may naturally lead to the (System 1) implicit

activation of supernatural concepts. The individual may explicitly experience the intuitive
appeal of such cognitions. Second, however, there may be differences in the (System 2)

expression of those intuitions. Religious believers may accept those intuitively appealing
cognitions, shape them into one’s culturally-relevant set of religious ideas (e.g.,
Christianity, Hinduism), and thus express those intuitions as explicitly accepted belief. In

contrast, atheists may not accept such religious concepts, despite recognizing them as
intuitively appealing, and thus may wield their available self-regulatory resources (e.g.,
analytic thinking) to over-ride and reject those intuitions and abstain from expressing

religious belief. Although no prior work has directly tested this set of ideas, a small but
growing body of research is consistent with them.
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On that first point, for example, if atheists are unable or unmotivated to reflect on

their worldviews and employ their cognitive resources to over-ride active religious
intuitions, then such intuitions will be expressed. When non-religious people reminded of
death are asked to make implicit associations between supernatural concepts and “real”

(Jong et al., 2012, Study 2 & 3)—such as on an IAT, a speeded method which likely

prevents them from employing their cognitive resources to over-ride intuition—they fail
to explicitly over-ride those intuitions and instead those existentially-activated intuitions

emerge in the form of stronger implicit association between religious concepts and the
category “real”. Thus, atheists might express religious concepts when they lack the ability

or motivation to regulate their expressions of intuition.

On that second point, in contrast, Vail et al., (2019 Study 1) found that whereas
MS caused Christian participants to increase their reliance on intuition (reduced analytic

thinking style), it led atheists to instead more strongly adopt an analytic cognitive style.
This finding may suggest that MS leads religious believers to rely on their intuitions,

whereas atheists may over-ride the natural cognitive intuitions that might have otherwise
led to expression of atheism-violating religious concepts. In other work, when atheists
were given the opportunity to self-report about religion—which presumably allows them

the opportunity to marshal such resources—they did indeed abstain from and reject

religious belief (e.g., Jong et al., 2012; (Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012; Vail et al.,
2016).
Thus, although prior research has not directly addressed the idea, it is nevertheless

consistent with the possibility that: a) heightened awareness of mortality may motivate
the activation of intuitive terror-managing cognitions, such as religious supernatural
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concepts; but then, b) once a person has the opportunity to draw upon their beliefs, s/he
can revise the impulse according to their worldview. If the person is Hindu, he might
shape the religious intuition into faith in the Trimurti, rendering a prayer to Vishnu or
Shiva begging for protection or asylum; or if Catholic, she might shape the impulse into
faith in the Trinity and render a prayer to God to intervene; but, if one is atheist, one

might shape that impulse into non-belief (over-ride the intuition) based on one’s belief
that supernatural concepts are false and/or that gods do not exist.

1.4 The Present Study
The present thesis proposes two theoretical ideas: 1) among religious believers,

mortality awareness should increase the intuitive appeal of religious concepts, as well as
the acceptance of those intuitions as expressed religious belief; and 2) among atheists,

mortality awareness should similarly increase the intuitive appeal of religious concepts,
but not expressed religious faith because (despite recognizing them as intuitively
appealing) atheists may wield their available self-regulatory resources (e.g., analytic

thinking) to over-ride and reject those intuitions and thus abstain from expressing
religious belief.
Therefore, the present study recruited religious believers (Christians) and non

believers (atheists). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental

conditions: either an MS condition or a non-death-related prime (pain) condition. Each

participant was then asked to rate the intuitive appeal of two religious concepts (“to what

extent do you want heaven to exist?” and a parallel question about God) and their
acceptance of those intuitions as expressed religious belief (e.g., “to what extent do you
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believe heaven exists?” and a parallel question about God). Based on my theoretical

analysis, this study tested two key hypotheses:
1. Among Christians, MS (vs. pain) should increase the extent to which they

want God and heaven/afterlife to exist (reflecting increased intuitive appeal),
as well as explicitly accepted belief that God and heaven/afterlife to exist;

2. Among atheists, MS (vs. pain) should similarly increase the extent to which

they want God and heaven/afterlife to exist (reflecting increased intuitive

appeal), but will not lead increase explicitly accepted belief that God and
heaven/afterlife to exist (reflecting self-regulatory over-ride/rejection of those

religious intuitions).
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CHAPTER II
METHODS

2.1 Estimation of Minimum Sample Size
To make sure the present study was well-powered enough to detect MS effects if
such effects are present, I consulted a prior meta-analysis of MS effects (Burke et al.,

2010), in which 164 articles with 277 experiments were analyzed; that work found an
overall MS effect size of r =.35 (d = .75) across various studies using a variety of
outcome variables (e.g., national identity, aggression, attitudes towards women, attitudes
towards animals, sports team affiliations, test scores etc.). Hence, assuming r = .35 (d =

.75), an a priori power analysis (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was

conducted which prescribed a minimum of 29 participants per each of the four betweensubjects conditions, for a minimum total sample size of 116 participants.

2.2 Participant Selection Procedure
Due to the difficulty of locating and recruiting sufficient numbers of local atheists
to attend lab sessions, a research panel company was used to reach participants
throughout the USA. For a two-week period, the company first administered a religious
category selection item to a panel of 5,000 possible participants. Then, the following day,

the critical study materials were administered to eligible panel members.
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Religious category selection item. The current study investigated the existential
motivations behind people either holding or rejecting supernatural beliefs. To do this, the

existing theoretical perspective suggests that an acceptable population for religious
believers would be “Christians” and the critical category for those who reject
supernatural beliefs should be the category of “atheist”. Therefore, the research panel

company recruited participants based on a single selection-criteria item, “What religion
or philosophy are you affiliated with if any?” Response options were: “Christian”;

“Muslim”; “Jewish”; “Buddhist”; “Hindu”; “Atheist (I do not believe supernatural beings
exist)”; “Spiritual (I believe supernatural beings do exist, but I do not follow a specific

religion)”; “Agnostic (I’m not sure whether, or it is impossible to know whether,
supernatural beings do or do not exist)”; and “other”.

For the current study, the data were collected from only those panel members who
indicated that their religious/ philosophical affiliation was either “Christian” or “atheist”.
Eligible “Christian” and “atheist” panel members were contacted and invited to
participate in the primary study with a US$1.50 incentive

2.3 Materials and Procedure
For all participants in the study, the materials were distributed electronically,
using a neutral title and description (e.g., “social attitudes and personality survey”) to

conceal its true purpose and associated hypotheses. After obtaining informed consent,

participants first completed a brief set of filler items (e.g., a personality measure) and
then the target materials, in the following order:

Personal need for structure. A short six-item version of the PNS scale

(Thomson et al., 2001) was presented. The PNS scale measures individual preferences for
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order, certainty, and unambiguous knowledge. Example items include, “I enjoy having a

clear and structured mode of life” and “I become uncomfortable when the rules in a
situation are not clear.” Each item used a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree,

6 = strongly agree).

Mortality salience manipulation. Following previous research (Rosenblatt et al.,

1989), participants were randomly assigned to respond to either MS or a negative event
topic prompt. In the MS condition, two prompts asked participants to, “Please briefly
describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you,” and “Jot down,
as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you physically die.” For the

control condition, a negative event topic prompt asked participants to, “Please briefly
describe the emotions that the thought of dental pain arouses in you,” and “Jot down, as

specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you physically experience
dental pain.” This comparison topic was chosen because the dental pain prompt evokes a
negative/anxiety-provoking event, and thus allowed to determine whether MS causes

effects beyond simply being reminded of a negative event.
Delay and distraction. Next, the 20-item positive and negative affect schedule

(PANAS, Watson & Clark, 1992) and a brief 3-5 minute reading task (an excerpt taken
from Albert Camus’ The Growing Stone) was used to act as a delay and task-switching

distraction needed to observe the effects of non-conscious awareness of mortality (see

Pyszczynski et al., 1999). This was considered to be necessary because when thoughts

related to death are in conscious awareness, individuals will deal with death-related

thoughts in a relatively rational manner such as by attempting to become healthier (e.g.,
reducing smoking) or use safety precautions to avoid death (e.g., put on a seatbelt).

20

However, when thoughts related to death are still accessible but no longer in conscious

attention, individuals will employ defenses that are more symbolic, such as by bolstering
one’s self-esteem or defending one’s cultural beliefs and ideologies.

Dependent measures. Participants then completed a series of four Likert-type (1
= Not at all, 6 = Very strongly) items: “To what extent do you want supernatural beings

to exist?”; “To what extent do you believe that supernatural beings actually do exist?”;
“To what extent do you want afterlife (e.g., heaven, eternal life) to exist?”; and “To what

extent do you believe that afterlife (e.g., heaven) actually does exist?”. Zero order

correlations between the dependent measures are reported in Table 3. As can be seen
from Table 3 the four dependent measures were significantly positively correlated with

each other. Although these measures were significantly positively correlated with each

other it is possible that desire for and belief in supernatural agents and afterlife are four
different measures measuring four different facets. E.g. it is conceivable one might desire
for and believe in an afterlife without having any desire for or belief in supernatural

agents. Hence, each of these items were treated as four separate measures measuring four
different constructs.
Demographics. At the end of the survey, participants completed a demographic

questionnaire about age, sex, ethnicity, race, and education levels.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS

3.1 Primary Analyses
A 2 (category: Christian vs. atheist) x 2 (MS vs. pain) x 4 (dependent measure:

want supernatural, believe supernatural, want afterlife, believe afterlife) mixed model
ANOVA was tested. Mauchly’s test indicated the assumption of sphericity had been

violated (/2 [5] = 127.31, p < .01), so the degrees of freedom of the omnibus interaction

tests were corrected using the Lower-bound (the most conservative) estimate of
sphericity (s = .33). Levene’s test also indicated the assumption of equality of variances
between groups had been violated for each dependent measure (F[3, 309]s > 5.75, ps <
.01), so main effects and pairwise comparisons were evaluated using Welch’s unequal

variances t-tests.1

There was an unqualified main effect of category (t[244.25]Welch = 23.68, d =
3.16, 95% CI = [2.52, 2.98], p < .001), such that scores on the dependent measures were
collectively higher among Christians (M = 4.38, SD = 1.29) than among atheists (M =

1.62, SD = .69). There was also a main effect of MS (t[286.51]Welch = 3.60, d = .66, 95%

1 Welch’s unequal variances test procedure is a parametric (thus, allowing analysis in the original metric)
alternative to the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test, and is more reliable than student’s t-test when
using unequal variances and unequal sample sizes (Ruxton, 2006).
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CI = [-1.07, -.32], p < .001), such that scores on the dependent measures were
collectively higher in the MS condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.88) than in the pain condition
(M = 2.69, SD = 1.50). However, the latter was qualified by the expected 3-way
interaction, F(1, 309) Lower-bound = 8.27, Hp2 = .03, P = .004 (see Table 1, Figure 1 ).

Pairwise comparisons were conducted to further explore the hypothesized effects within
the interaction.
Among Christians. Desire for supernatural agents was higher in the MS

condition than in the pain condition (t[155.26]Welch = 3.91, d = .63, CI = [-1.40, -.46], p <
.001); belief in supernatural agents was higher in the MS condition than in the pain

condition (t[156.12]Welch = 5.57, d = .89, CI = [-1.90, -.90], p < .001); desire for afterlife
was higher in the MS condition than in the pain condition (t[149.06]Welch = 3.89, d = .64,
CI = [-1.18, -.38], p < .001); belief in afterlife was higher in the MS condition than in the
pain condition (t[151.20]Welch = 5.22, d = .85, CI = [-1.16, -.75], p < .001).
Among atheists. Desire for supernatural agents was higher in the MS condition

than in the pain condition (t[129.76]Welch = 2.16, d = .40, CI = [-.888, -.03], p = .03);

however, belief in supernatural agents was marginally lower in the MS condition than in
the pain condition (t[139.05]Welch = -1.84, d = -.31, CI = [-.01, .33], p = .07); desire for

afterlife was higher in the MS condition than in the pain condition (t[139.90]Welch = 2.17,
d = .37, CI = [-1.14, -.05] p = .03); however, belief in afterlife was marginally lower in

the MS condition than in the pain condition (t[105.02]Welch = -1.87, d = -.36, CI = [-.006,
.19], p = .07).
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3.2 Ancillary Analyses: Demographics, PNS, Affect

As is reported in the supplementary analysis, the Christian and atheist samples did
not differ on race, ethnicity, or education level. However, the atheist sample was younger

than the Christian sample, and the Christian sample had more females than males

whereas the atheist sample had more males than females. The atheist sample also had

lower PNS scores than the Christian sample. Therefore, we examined whether differences

in age, sex, and PNS could have explained (mediated) the moderating effect of being

atheist vs. Christian in the observed 2 (category: atheist vs Christian) x 2 (MS vs. control)
interactions on the dependent measures. However, whereas religious category moderated

the MS effect on belief in supernatural agents and belief in afterlife, neither age nor sex
nor PNS similarly moderated the MS effect, and were therefore not viable mediators.

Positive and negative affect were also analyzed using 2 (category: Christian vs.
atheist) x 2 (MS vs. pain) ANOVAs, and there was an interaction on each. The negative
affect interaction pattern did not mimic the supernatural belief or afterlife belief

interaction patterns, and thus was not a viable mediator. The positive affect interaction
pattern did mimic the supernatural belief and afterlife belief interaction patterns, and was

therefore a viable mediator, but a PROCESS model test for conditional indirect effects
(mediation) suggested that positive affect did not mediate the effects on supernatural

belief or afterlife belief. See the supplementary analysis for details.
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

First, it was hypothesized that among Christians MS (vs. pain) should lead to
increased desire for supernatural beings and afterlife concepts, reflecting the intuitive
appeal for such concepts along with an increased explicit belief that supernatural beings

and the afterlife do exist. The data supported this hypothesis. Following the main effects
for both category (Christians vs. Atheists) and MS (vs. pain), pairwise comparisons

revealed that for Christians desire for and belief in supernatural and afterlife concepts
were higher in the MS condition as compared to the control condition.
Second, for atheists, it was hypothesized that MS (vs. pain) should lead to an

increased desire for supernatural beings and afterlife concepts thus revealing a similar

intuitive pull of such concepts, but that it would not increase explicit belief in such
concepts reflecting an override/rejection of the religious intuitions. In line with the

hypothesis, results from pairwise comparisons showed that for atheists MS (vs. pain) lead
to increased desire for supernatural agents and afterlife but did not lead to increased

belief in such concepts. In fact, belief in supernatural agents and the afterlife were
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marginally lower in the MS condition as compared to the control condition. The

implications of these results are discussed below.

4.1 Implications
The present study contributes to our understanding of the psychology of religion

in some unique ways. By assimilating ideas from TMT and dual-process model of
religious cognition, the present study tests how the intuitive desire for supernatural and
afterlife concepts systematically differs from the explicitly held beliefs about such
concepts. The results from the present study also help us understand how these processes

manifest differently among Christians and atheists; although the intuitive appeal of
supernatural and afterlife concepts are similarly recognized across the board despite one’s

religious (or non-religious) beliefs, especially under conditions where mortality is made
salient, such desire does not directly transfer to explicitly held beliefs,. Instead, the results
from the study suggest that, when mortality is made salient, these intuitions are regulated

in a manner that is consistent with one’s prior worldviews, leading Christians to accept
these intuitions as expressly held beliefs and leading atheists to override those intuitions

and reject such beliefs. These results further add support to: a) the dual-process model of

religious cognition (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), in terms of showing that religious
concepts are largely reliant on System 1 processing and do indeed hold an intuitive pull;

and also b) the worldview defense account of religion (Vail et al., 2010), by showing that
these intuitions will be expressed as beliefs only if they are consistent with one’s
worldviews.

Furthermore, the results of the present study converge with previous findings that

show that atheism sometimes appears to be a result of conscious effort involving override
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of the intuitions that are the product of default cognitive inclinations and is associated
more engagement with analytical (System 2), self-regulatory thinking styles (Silver et al.,

2014; Pennycook et al., 2012). This is especially true under conditions of mortality
salience where research has shown that mortality salience leads Christians to increase
reliance on their intuitions, and leads atheists to adopt a more analytical thinking style
when they are able to draw upon their cognitive resources i.e. engage in System 2

processing (Vail et al., 2019, Study 1).

Additionally, the present study adds further clarity to some of the results found in

previous research on the intuitive appeal of religious beliefs under conditions where

mortality is made salient. E.g. in their study Jong et al. (2012 Study 2 & 3) using IAT
found that mortality salience led to a stronger implicit association between supernatural
concepts (e.g. God, soul, Hell) and the category “real” among both religious and non

religious participants. However, from their study, it was not very clear whether these
implicit associations indicated a belief in such concepts or whether they simply reflect an

intuitive pull towards such concepts. By separately measuring the desire for supernatural
and afterlife concepts and belief in supernatural and afterlife concepts the results from the

current study potentially suggests that these implicit associations are more likely to

reflect an intuitive appeal of these religious concepts rather than belief in those concepts.

4.2 Limitations and Future Directions
One possible limitation of the present study is that the study used a single-item to

measure desire and belief in the supernatural and afterlife concepts. However, multi-item

measures are primarily desirable when the latent construct is poorly understood, poorly
defined, or difficult to measure exactly, such as diffuse latent constructs with various
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definitions, aspects, or facets (e.g., neuroticism, extroversion). In such cases, multiple

items are used to triangulate on the latent variable of interest, with internal consistency
estimates being a measure of reliably overlapping measurement of that construct.
However, as measurement improves, or when hypotheses are articulated with sufficient

specificity, single-item measures are often both more efficient and appropriate. On that
note, it should be pointed out that single-item measures have been successfully used to

measure constructs like self-esteem (Robins et al., 2001), the Big Five personality traits

(Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), attention at work (Gardner et al., 1998) and social

identification (Postmes, Haslam & Jans, 2013) among others. In the present research,

although there are a variety of definitions, aspects, and facets of religiosity, the only two
facets that were relevant to the presently articulated hypotheses were the aspects of

intuitive appeal (desire) and expressed/accepted belief, so face-valid single-item
measures were sufficient to investigate the present research question as it pertained to the

intuitive appeal and expressed belief in the religious concepts of supernatural agents and
afterlife—two of the conceptually defining features of religion, as articulated in the

Introduction section above.

Another potential limitation of the present study is that the present study asked
respondents to rate their desire for and belief in Supernatural agents. It is conceivable that
one could interpret the term Supernatural agents in a manner that is not religious e.g. in

terms of various fictional superhero characters found in movies. Although the floor

effects found among atheists in the MS condition suggest that the term supernatural
agents were interpreted within the religious contexts, future research should employ
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measures that look at the desire for and belief in supernatural agents within the religious
context.

4.3 Conclusion
The appeal of religious beliefs especially in face of existential concerns has been

a topic of much research and discussion within psychological literature and the broader
philosophical and theological literature in general. For Tolstoy, leaning on his Christian
faith allowed him to deal with the anxiety that resulted from the realization of the

inevitability of death. Consistent with this, the present research shows that awareness of

mortality leads Christians to find the supernatural and afterlife concepts more desirable
and increase their expressed faith in those same concepts. In contrast to this and

consistent with Primo Levi’s account of unwavering atheism, even in face of death, the
results from the present study also show that among atheists although mortality salience
increases the desire for supernatural and afterlife concepts it does not increase their belief

in them. The results of the present study further contribute to a growing literature
showing that the intuitive appeal of religious beliefs is felt similarly across the board

independent of one’s prior religious convictions (Jarnefelt et al, 2015), that mortality
awareness leads to maintenance of or even increase in one’s prior beliefs be it religious or
atheistic (Jong et al 2012, Vail et al, 2012), and that atheists tend to reject religious

beliefs by engaging in analytical (System 2) thinking styles and overriding their default

cognitive intuitions (Silver et al., 2014; Shenhav et al., 2012).
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Table 1
Participant descriptive and frequency statistics.
Demographic
Christian
atheist
Total sample
Age
37.03 (12.27)
34.00 (11.33)
35.54(11.90)
Sex
Male
69
93
162
Female
89
60
149
Did not report
1
1
2
Ethnicity
Hispanic or Latino
17
12
29
Non-Hispanic or Latino
141
142
283
Did not report
1
0
1
Race
Caucasian
138
133
271
African American
10
5
15
Native American/Native
1
2
3
Alaskan
Asian/Pacific Islander
5
11
16
Other
5
3
8
Years of education
15.25 (2.17)
15.57 (2.41)
15.41 (2.29)
Note. Sums and means are presented, with standard deviations following means in parentheses

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of each of the four dependent measures, in the MS and
dental pain conditions, among Christians and among atheists.
Want
Believe
Want
Believe
supernatural
supernatural
afterlife to
afterlife
to exist
exists
exist
exists
M
M
M
M
n
SD
SD
SD
SD

Christians
Mortality
salience
Pain
salience

4.47

1.55

4.55

1.62

5.50

1.09

5.19

1.29

78

3.54

1.45

3.15

1.56

4.72

1.43

3.98

1.64

81

Atheists
Mortality
2.07
1.14a
2.67 1.85
1.03a .16
73
1.51
.42
salience
Pain
1.60
1.09
1.30a
.64
2.07 1.52
1.12a .43
81
salience_______________________________________________________________
Note: Means with the same superscript were not significantly different; all other MS vs.
Pain salience pairwise comparisons were significantly different, see text for effect sizes.
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Table 3. Zero order correlations for each of the four dependent measures, PNS, PANAS.

To what extent
do you
want supernatu
ral beings to
exist?
To what extent
do you
believe that
supernatural
beings actually
do exist?
To what extent
do you want aft
erlife (e.g.,
heaven, eternal
life) to exist?
To what extent
do you believe
that afterlife
(e.g., heaven)
actually does
exist?
PNS_Mean

To what
extent do
you
want sup
ernatural
beings to
exist?

To what
extent
do you
believe
that
super
natural
beings
actually
do exist?

To what
extent
do you
want
afterlife
(e.g.,
heaven,
eternal
life) to
exist?

To what
extent
do you b
elieve
that
afterlife
(e.g.,
heaven)
actually
does
exist?

1

.781**

.665**

.647**

.173**

.137*

.053

315

.000
314

.000
315

.000
314

.002
315

.015
315

.349
315

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.781**

1

.621**

.806**

.183**

.205**

-.036

.000
314

314

.000
314

.000
313

.001
314

.000
314

.527
314

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.665**

.621**

1

.752**

.192**

.111*

.012

.000
315

.000
314

315

.000
314

.001
315

.048
315

.828
315

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.647**

.806**

.752**

1

.234**

.208**

-.066

.000
314

.000
313

.000
314

314

.000
314

.000
314

.241
314

.234**

1

.034

-.021

.000
314
.208**

315
.034

.543
315
1

.705
315
-.368**

.000
314
-.066

.543
315
-.021

315
-.368**

.000
315
1

.241
314

.705
315

.000
315

315

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.173**
.183**
.192**
Pearson
Correlation
.002
.001
.001
Sig. (2-tailed)
315
314
315
N
Positive_affect Pearson
.137*
.205**
.111*
Correlation
.015
.000
.048
Sig. (2-tailed)
315
314
315
N
Negative_affect Pearson
.053
-.036
.012
Correlation
.349
.527
.828
Sig. (2-tailed)
315
314
315
N
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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PNS_
Mean

Positive_ Negative
affect
affect

Christians

Atheists
Figure 1. The effects of MS (vs. pain) on each of the four dependent measures, among
Christians and among atheists.
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APPENDIX A: Supplementary Materials

[Personality/filler items]

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

Please read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word. Use the following scale for your answers.

1

2

3

4

6

5

7

8

9

10
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

___
___
___
___
___

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from
it.
I’m not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine.
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
I enjoy being spontaneous.
I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious.
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[Manipulation #1: Mortality salience]

The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment.
Recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us
a considerable amount about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey
will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your
honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF
YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU.

2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK HAPPENS
TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE.
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[Manipulation #2: Control Condition]

The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment.
Recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us
a considerable amount about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey
will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your
honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.
1. PLEASE BREIFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF
DENTAL PAIN AROUSES IN YOU.

2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK HAPPENS
TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPEREINCE DENTAL PAIN.
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[Distractor task: PANAS, Watson & Clark, 1992]

For each item below, indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the
following scale.
1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Interested

_ ___ Guilty

___ Irritable

____Determined

Disinterested

_ ___ Scared

___ Alert

____Attentive

Excited

_ ___ Hostile

___ Ashamed

____Jittery

Upset

_ ___ Enthusiastic

___ Inspired

____Active

Strong

_ ___ Proud

___ Nervous

____Afraid
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Verbal Cues Questionnaire: Literature
Please read the following short passage and answer the questions below it.

The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone trail, now a
mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—first on one side of the
road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet metal roofs. On the right near the
second one, a tower of course beams could be made out in the light fog. From the top of
the tower a metal cable, invisible at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the
light from the car before disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The
car slowed down and stopped a few yards from the huts.
The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored to extricate
himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame lurched a little. In the shadow
beside the car, solidly planted on the ground and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to
be listening to the idling motor. Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and
entered the cone of light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad
back outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light from
the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s face, smiling. The man signaled and the
chauffeur turned off the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell over the trail and the
forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard.
The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark motion
flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far beyond, must be the
other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see on that still bank a yellowish
light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man turned back toward the car and nodded.
The chauffeur switched off the lights, turned them on again, then blinked them regularly.
On the embankment the man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each
time he came back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by
an invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, the man
disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining intermittently. On
each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage stood out against the sky and
seemed very near. The fine rain that had soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering
in the warm air, intensifying the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the
virgin forest. In the black sky misty stars flickered.
1.

Do you think the author of this story is male or female?
_______male
_______ female

2. Do you think the narrator is “part” of the story (a character), or simply a third person
voice?
_______The narrator is a story character _______ The narrator is not a story
character
3.

What age might the author have been at the time this passage was written?
_______ 15-20 yearsold
________ 41-50 years old
_______ 21-30 yearsold
________ 51-60 years old
_______ 31-40 yearsold
________ 61-70 years old
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4.

How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the story?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
not at all
somewhat
very
descriptive
descriptive
descriptive
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[Dependent measure: Desire and Belief in Supernatural Agents]
1. To what extent do you want supernatural beings to exist?

2

1

3

4

5

Not at all

6

Very strongly

2. To what extent do you believe supernatural beings to exist? ____

2

1

3

4

5

Not at all

6

Very strongly

3. To what extent to you want afterlife (e.g., heaven, eternal life) to exist?

2

1

3

4

5

Not at all

4.

6

Very strongly

To what extent to you believe afterlife (e.g., heaven) actually does exist? __

1

2

3

4

Not at all

5

6

Very strongly
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Demographic

1.) What is your age? _____

2.) What is your sex? _____ Male

_____Female

3 .) Is English your native language?

4 .) What is your ethnicity? ___ Hispanic or Latino ____ Not Hispanic or Latino
5 .) What is your race? (check only one)
_____ 1. Caucasian
_____2. African American
_____3. American Indian/Native Alaskan

4. Asian/Pacific Islander
5. Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
____ 6. Other (specify): ____________

6 .) How many years of education have you completed? ________
(e.g., if completed through sophomore year of high school, enter 10; if graduated from
high school, enter 12; if four years of college, enter 16; and so on)
7 .) Please rate your political orientation:
1
2
3
4
5
Progressive

6

Conservative

Moderate

8 .) How strongly do you identify with your political orientation, indicated in #5 above?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Important

Not at all important

Moderate

9 .) With which political party do you most strongly identify? (circle one)
Democratic party
Green party
Constitution party
Republican party
Libertarian party
Other: ________
10 .) How strongly do you identify with the political party indicated in #7 above? (circle
one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Important

Moderate

Not at all important

11.) Please indicate your religious affiliation, if any (please circle one):
1. Christian
6. Atheist (I do not believe supernatural beings exist)
2. Muslim
7. Spiritual (I believe supernatural beings exist, but I do not
3. Jewish
follow a specific religion)
4. Buddhist
8. Agnostic (I’m not sure whether, or it is not possible to know
5. Hindu
whether, supernatural beings do or do not exist)
9. Other: __________________________

12 .) Please indicate the strength of your religious/philosophical belief:
1
2
3
4
5
Very strong strong

moderate weak very weak
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APPENDIX B: Supplemental Analyses

Supplemental analyses: Demographics

Descriptive statistics and frequencies of basic demographics (age, sex, race,
ethnicity, education) are shown in Table 1 of the main text. The atheist sample was
younger than the Christian sample (t[311] = 2.26, p = .02). Cross-tabulation showed ((%2
[1] = 9.12, p = .003) the samples differed in that the Christian sample had more females
(56%) than males (44%), whereas the atheist sample had more males (61%) than females
(39%), reflecting the broader atheist population (Pew Research Center, 2015). Cross
tabulation did not find that the samples differed in race ((%2[ [1] = 4.76, p = .31) nor
ethnicity ((%2[ [1] = .81, p = .37). The samples of atheists and Christians also did not
differ in their years of education (t[311] = 1.26, p = .21). Because the atheist sample was
younger and had a higher proportion of males, I examined whether age and sex
differences could have explained (mediated) the moderating effect of being atheist vs.
Christian in the observed 2 (category: atheist vs Christian) x 2 (MS vs. control)
interactions on the dependent measures.
To analyze age as the potential alternative moderator, standard methods for
analyzing continuous x categorical interactions were followed, as prescribed by Aiken &
West (1991). Years of age was centered about the mean, MS was dummy coded, and the
interaction term was computed. Main effects showed that MS tended to increase scores
on all four dependent measures (described above) and age tended to be positively
associated with desire for supernatural agents (fi = .09, t [312] = 1.59, p = .11), belief in
supernatural agents (fi = .11, t[312] = 1.88, p = .06), desire for afterlife (fi = .12, t[312] =
2.08, p = .04), and belief in afterlife (fi = .14, t [312] = 2.46, p = .01). The MS x age
interaction was not significant for desire for supernatural agents (F[1, 309] = 1.01, , R2A
= .003, p = .32), belief in supernatural agents (F[1, 309] = .04, R2A < .01, p = .84), for
desire for afterlife (F[1, 309] = 2.77, R2A = .01, p = .10), nor belief in afterlife (F[1, 309]
= 1.46, R2A = .005, p = .29).
To analyze sex as the potential alternative moderator, 2 (category: female vs.
male) x 2 (MS vs. pain) x 4 (dependent measure: want supernatural, believe supernatural,
want afterlife, believe afterlife) mixed model ANOVA was tested. Mauchly’s test
indicated the assumption of sphericity had been violated (/2 [5] = 132.88, p < .01), so the
degrees of freedom of the omnibus test were corrected using the Lower-bound (the most
conservative) estimate of sphericity (s = .33). Levene’s test also indicated the assumption
of equality of variances between groups had been violated for each dependent measure
(F[3, 307]s > 2.56, ps < .055), so main effects were evaluated using Welch’s unequal
variances t-tests. There were main effects of MS (as described above) and of sex
(t[303.68]Welch = 3.63, d = .42, p < .001), such that scores on the dependent measures
were collectively higher among females (M = 3.38, SD = 1.74) than among males (M =
2.68, SD = 1.65). However, there was no Sex x MS 2-way (F[1, 307] = .13, Hp2 < .01, p
= .72) nor 3-way interaction (F[1, 307] Lower-bound = 1.76, Hp2 < .01, p = .19).
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Whereas religious category moderated the MS effect on belief in supernatural
agents and belief in afterlife, neither age nor sex exerted a similar moderating effect.
Thus, neither age nor sex were viable mediators, so neither were considered further.

Supplemental analyses: Personal need for structure.
An independent samples t-test showed that, compared to Christians (M = 4.47, SD
= .90), atheists (M = 4.01, SD = .99) reported lower PNS (t[311] = -4.25, p < .01). As an
initial probe for whether this difference in PNS could have explained (mediated) the
effect of being atheist vs Christian, I first checked to see whether there were similar PNS
x MS effects on each of the four dependent measures. Continuous x categorical
interactions were analyzed following standard methods prescribed by Aiken & West
(1991). PNS was centered about the mean, MS was dummy coded, and the interaction
term was computed.
Main effects showed that MS tended to increase scores on all four dependent
measures (described above) and PNS tended to be positively associated with desire for
supernatural agents (P = .16, t [312] = 2.94, p = .004), belief in supernatural agents (P =
.17, t [312] = 3.12, p = .002), desire for afterlife (p = .19, t [312] = 3.35, p = .001), and
belief in afterlife (P = .23, t[312] = 4.21, p < .001). However, there were no MS x PNS
interactions on desire for supernatural agents (F[1, 309] = .004, R2A < .001, p = .95),
belief in supernatural agents (F[1, 309] = 1.84, R2A = .01, p = .18), desire for afterlife
(F[1, 309] = .001, R2A < .001, p = .97), nor belief in afterlife (F[1, 309] = .10, R2A <
.001, p = .76).
Whereas religious category moderated the MS effect on belief in supernatural
agents and belief in afterlife, PNS did not exert a similar moderating effect. Thus, PNS
was not a viable mediator and is not considered further.

Supplemental analyses: Affect.
Positive and negative affect were analyzed using 2 (category: Christian vs.
atheist) x 2 (MS vs. pain) ANOVAs. When analyzing positive affect, there was no main
effect of MS (F[1, 309] = .10, nP2 < .01, p = .75); there emerged an unqualified main
effect of category (F[1, 309] = 13.55, nP2 = .04, p < .01), such that positive affect was
higher among Christians (M = 4.03, SD = .87) than among atheists (M = 3.68, SD = .88).
However, the interaction also emerged, F(1, 309) = 8.24, qP2 = .03, p = .004 (see Figure
S1). Pairwise comparisons were conducted to further explore the interaction on positive
affect. Among Christians, positive affect was higher in the MS condition (M = 4.19, SD =
.93) condition than in the pain condition (M = 3.87, SD = .78) (t[157] = 2.27, d = .36, p =
.02). Among atheists, however, positive affect was lower in the MS condition (M = 3.54,
SD = .92) condition than in the pain condition (M = 3.79, SD = .83) (t[152] = -1.79, d = .29, p = .08).
This interaction pattern suggests that MS increased positive affect among
Christians but decreased it among atheists, matching the patterns observed on belief in
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supernatural agents and belief in afterlife. It is possible that changes in positive affect
mediated the changes in belief in supernatural agents and afterlife, or vice versa. Thus,
we conducted a formal test of the conditional indirect effect of positive affect within the
Category x MS interactions on belief using model 8 (Figure S2, Panel A) of the
PROCESS statistical macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). This model used a bootstrapping
method (5000 bootstrapped resamples) to estimate the various path coefficients specified
in Figure S2 (Panel B). The models indicated (Table S1) that positive affect did not
statistically mediate the effect of the Category x MS interactions on belief in supernatural
agents or afterlife. There were no higher order indirect effects (b = .04, 95%CI = [-.04,
.18]) nor conditional indirect effects of MS on belief in supernatural agents among
neither atheists (b = -.02, 95%CI = [-.10, .01]) nor Christians (b = .02, 95%CI = [-.02,
.11]). There were also no higher order indirect effects (b = .03, 95%CI = [-.05, .14]) nor
conditional indirect effects of MS on belief in afterlife among neither atheists (b = -.01,
95%CI = [-.08, .02]) nor Christians (b = .01, 95%CI = [-.03, .09]). Thus, positive affect
did not mediate the effect of MS on belief in supernatural agents nor belief in afterlife.
When analyzing negative affect, there was no main effect of category (F[1, 309] =
.21, ^p2 < .01,p = .65), MS (F[1, 309] = 1.41, ^p2 < .01,p = .24), but there was a 2
(category: Christian vs. atheist) x 2 (MS vs. pain) interaction (F[1, 309] = 4.28, ^p2 = .01,
p = .04). Levene’s test indicated the assumption of equality of variances between groups
had been violated (F[3, 309] = 2.89, p = .04), so pairwise comparisons were evaluated
using Welch’s unequal variances t-tests. Among Christians, negative affect was lower in
the MS condition (M = 1.93, SD = .93) condition than in the pain condition (M = 2.26, SD
= .97) (t[157.00]Welch = -2.19, d = 0.35, p = .03). Among atheists, negative affect was not
significantly different in the MS condition (M = 2.10, SD = .77) condition than in the pain
condition (M = 2.01, SD = .89) (t[151.71]Welch = -.67, d = .011, p = .50). This effect of
religious category and MS on negative affect did not mimic the effect on belief in
supernatural agents nor belief in afterlife, so negative affect was not a viable mediator
and is not considered further.
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Positive affect

4.5

Figure 2. The effects of MS (vs. pain) on positive affect among Christians and among
atheists.
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Figure 3. An illustration of the moderated mediation model, which tested whether
positive affect mediates the moderated effect of MS (vs pain) among each category
(atheist vs religion) on belief in supernatural agents (Model 1) and belief in afterlife
(Model 2). Panel A depicts the conceptual model, Panel B depicts the statistical model.
The models found that there were no higher order or conditional indirect effects through
positive affect.
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Table S1
Mediated moderation process model statistics.
Outcome: Positive affect
Coefficient (b)
SE
t
P
constant
3.80
.10
39.39
< .001
a1
Category
.08
.14
.58
.56
a2
MS
-.25
.14
-1.79
.08
2.87
.004
a3
Category x MS interaction
.56
.20
MODEL 1: Belief in supernatural agent:s
Outcome: Belief in supernatural agents
t
P
Coefficient (b)
SE
constant
1.02
.33
3.14
.002
b1
Positive affect
.07
.08
.92
.36
c1
Category
1.85
.19
9.83
< .001
c2
MS
-.14
.19
-.73
.47
1.52
5.55
< .001
C3
Category x MS interaction
.27
Conditional direct effects on belief in
LLCI
Coefficient
SE
ULCI
supernatural agents
Atheists: MS
-.14
.19
-.52
.24
1.38
1.00
1.76
Christians: MS
.19
Conditional indirect effects on belief in
LLCI
Coefficient
SE
ULCI
supernatural agents
Atheists: MS via positive affect
-.02
.03
-.10
.01
-.02
Christians: MS via positive affect
.02
.03
.11
Higher order indirect effect on belief in
Index
LLCI
SE
ULCI
supernatural agents
-.04
Category x MS via positive affect
.04
.05
.18
MODEL 2: Bel ief in afterlife
Outcome: Belief in afterlife
t
P
Coefficient (b)
SE
constant
.94
.29
3.22
.001
b1
Positive affect
.05
.07
.66
.51
c1
Category
2.85
.17
16.80
< .001
c2
MS
-.08
.18
-.48
.63
1.28
5.20
<
.001
c3
Category x MS interaction
.25
Conditional direct effects on belief in afterlife
LLCI
Coefficient
SE
ULCI
Atheists: MS
-.08
.18
-.43
.26
1.20
.86
Christians: MS
.17
1.54
Conditional indirect effects on belief in afterlife
LLCI
Coefficient
SE
ULCI
Atheists: MS via positive affect
-.01
.02
-.08
.02
-.03
.09
Christians: MS via positive affect
.01
.03
Higher order indirect effect on belief in afterlife
Index
LLCI
SE
ULCI
-.05
Category x MS via positive affect
.03
.05
.14
Note. Category was coded, 0 = atheist, 1 = Christian; MS was coded, 0 = pain, 1 = MS; LLCI =
Lower limit 95% confidence interval; ULCI = Upper limit 95% confidence interval. Model 1 and
2 are separate PROCESS models with same a-paths, thus presented together for brevity.
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